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Abstract
Congress has been increasingly criticized as a broken, gridlocked, polarized, ineffective institution. In this paper we seek to explore the consequences of polarization
and whether legislators take steps to alleviate them. We hypothesize that participation in the voluntary, bipartisan, caucus system provides opportunities for legislators to
build cross-partisan relationships and prot from shared information, which can alleviate some of the negative eects of polarization. We operationalize polarization using
dyadic covoting and show that legislators are more likely to covote if they share more
caucus connections, controlling for a variety of factors that predict voting. The data in
this analysis spans 9 congresses (1993-2010) and includes multiple connections between
legislators.
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Introduction
In this paper we seek to examine whether legislators in the US Congress can alleviate
some of the immobilizing eects of partisan polarization through the social and informational
benets of voluntary caucuses. It is well understood that congress has become increasingly
polarized in recent years. Figure 1 shows the polarization in Congress by party using roll
call votes from 1879-2009 (Poole and Rosenthal 2007).

While a vast literature exists to

help explain the sources of this polarization, in this paper we focus on its consequences.
Scholars and pundits frequently point to congressional polarization as a contributing feature
of gridlock in Washington. Meanwhile, new research suggests that some institutional features
of legislatures, such as parties and committee, place constraints on legislators' ability to make
connections with one another and spread information. Legislators, in part, solve this problem
by creating legislative member organizations (LMOs), frequently called caucuses in the U.S.
Congress (Ringe and Victor 2013). Given the recent proliferation of caucuses in Congress
this research explores the possibility that MCs use caucuses to help alleviate some frustration
caused by polarization and gridlock.

Figure 1: Congressional Polarization: DW-Nominate Scores by party 1879-2009

Theory
The roll call record makes the increasing partisan polarization of the U.S. Congress readily
apparent.

In the 20-year period between 1992 and 2012 party groups in Congress have

become more internally homogenous, and their medians have become increasingly distant
from one another, according to roll call votes. Roll calls are a reasonable way to measure
the ideological nature of individual legislators and of the Congress, and have formed the
basis for such analyses for decades (e.g., NOMINATE scores, see (Poole and Rosenthal 1997,
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2007). The sources of this increased polarization are numerous and highly related to electoral
competition (Abramowitz and Gunning 2006; Lebo and Koger 2007).
There is also increasing evidence that the polarization in congress results in decreased
productivity, or at least and increased dissatisfaction with the institution (Madison 2012).
Using the resume of the Congress we looked at the overall productivity of Congress during
this time period (Senate 2012).

Figure 2: Legislative productivity of the House of Representatives 1993-2010

Figure 2 shows that while House members have actively and increasingly introduced legislation over the period of study, the percent of their bills that pass into law has declined.
This suggests that single party coalitions pass bills through the chamber that do not become
law. For example, in recent years the Republicans have repealed the Aordable Healthcare
Act ("Obamacare") 37 times (Farenthold 2013). This is a symbolic act of partisan politics,
not a genuine gesture in lawmaking, as Republicans know that President Obama and the
Democratically controlled Senate will not follow course. As the legislative gridlock associated with partisan polarization increases, some legislators may seek means of alleviating the
negative consequences of gridlock. While it may not be possible to overcome polarization in
a way that leads to increased productivity, legislators may seek ways to increase their level
of contact and interaction with their peersparticularly cross partisans.
Legislators have strong incentives to stay in communication with members of the opposite party because the need for broad-based political and policy information is deep. Also,
legislators have strong incentives to seek interactions with those with whom they are likely to
disagree in order to obtain strategic advantage (Huckfeldt and Sprague. 1987), deeper awareness of opposing viewpoints (Mutz 2006), and to increase the condence in an individual's
preference ordering by checking it against the preferences of allies or adversaries with known
preferences (Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013). It is therefore logical to expect lawmakers in
a highly partisan legislature to seek opportunities to interact with cross-partisans o the
chamber oor.
For this reason, we expect that members of Congress in highly polarized voting environments will be more likely to join bipartisan caucuses. If this is true, then we should observe
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growth in the caucus system, and growth in bi-partisan caucuses in particular, to occur as a
result of increasing partisanship, rather than the other way around.

Bridging the Information Gap: Legislative Member Organizations in the United States and European Union , Ringe and Victor show that legislators
In the forthcoming volume

use Legislative Member Organizations (LMOs) (e.g., caucuses in congress) to make connections to legislators with whom they are not otherwise connected (see especially Chapter
5) (Ringe and Victor 2013). LMOs, they argue, oer institutional exibility not oered by
parties and committees. As voluntary organizations with (potentially) unlimited issue scope
caucuses oer an opportunity for MCs to collaborate on issues for which they share policy
priority (but not necessarily preferences). Ringe and Victor show that the casual nature of
caucuses are a benet to their longevity because for all but the caucus leaders, participation in caucuses, their events, activities, and communication is low-cost and there are no
consequences for shirking. Moreover, the potential for caucuses to produce valuable and useful information about policy (e.g., expert information) or politics (e.g., legislative strategy
or legislators' revealed preferences) is real, as caucuses tend to be supported by a massive
complex of interest groups that use caucuses as a means to access legislators (see especially
Chapter 6) (Ringe and Victor 2013) (also Hall and Deardor 2006; Esterling 2007). Interest groups supply caucuses with high quality information which gets quickly disseminated
through the network of caucus members for each caucus. The more caucuses an MC joins,
the higher the probability that s/he will be exposed to such information across a variety of
issue topics.
Caucus participation, then, provides the opportunity for MCs to make connections of
dierent sorts to other legislators. As caucuses are more bi-partisan, the probability of using
caucuses to connect to legislators of the opposite party increases. We therefore expect that
as legislators become more involved in caucuses and have the increased opportunity to be
connected to other legislators their tendency to vote in lock-step with their party will decline.
Legislators who are involved in many caucuses will be exposed to more viewpoints, more
policy proposals, and more colleagues from across the aisle. Those who are most involved in
caucuses, we argue, will be less likely to consistently vote with their party, and be more likely
to buck the party. Caucus participation has the potential to provide benets to individual
legislators in terms of building relationships and providing access to high quality information
(Ringe and Victor 2013). These activities can decrease polarization if legislators use them to
connect with opposite partisans and get exposed to opposing viewpoints in non-threatening
settings. We therefore have the following expectation.

For any two legislators, as they become more connected in the caucus network
their likelihood of voting the same way will increase, all else being equal.
Hypothesis 1

Research Design
Our eort to understand the complexities of voting behavior requires a deep and longitudinal dataset. Since upwards of 90 percent of voting behavior can be explained by party
or ideology, we must control for these commonalities between legislators and hope to explain
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the remaining variance in roll calls. In this section we describe our data and data collection
process.
Partisan polarization, observed at the dyadic level, is the frequency with which two legislators cast the same votes. We therefore measure polarization as covoting, where polarization
and covoting are negatively associated (see Sinclair 2011).

An increase in covoting repre-

sents a decline in polarization. While polarization is frequently represented as an aggregate
measure, summarized by the roll call behavior of legisaltors in a congress, we prefer to disagregate polarization. Taking a dyadic approach, we suggest that a legislative pair who cast
few or no votes alike are "polarized," but a pair who votes alike all the time does not exhibit
polarization. We therefore seek to explain the frequency of dyadic covoting as a function of
caucus participation.
We are, of course, not the rst to attempt to link social ties to legislative voting. For
example, previous research has considered the impact of friendship (Caldeira and Patterson.
1987), cosponsorship (Cho and Fowler. 2010; Fowler 2006; Koger 2003), spatial proximity (Masket 2008), sta connections (Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2013), lobbyists' donations
(Koger and Victor 2009), and legislative member organizations, such as caucuses in the US
Congress and intergroups in the European Parliament (EP) (Ringe and Victor 2013).
We collect data on legislators in the U.S. Congress from 1993-2010, or congresses 103-111.
We take a kitchen-sink approach to control variables, because we expect the substantive eect
of caucus participation on covoting to be small. We seek to control for a variety of factors
that are known to determine roll call votes, including serving in the same party, serving on
the same committees, being from the same state, the mean electoral winning percent of the
dyad, the electoral percent dierence, the number of terms served, the number of common
cosponsored bills, serving as a legislative leader (including committee chairs and ranking
members), gender, mean betweenness, and mean degree.
We collect roll call data from the 103rd through 111th congresses (Poole and McCarty
2011). The resources from voteview.com also provide data on legislators' party aliations,
state delegations, and ideological scores (Poole and McCarty 2011). We collected congressional caucus membership information from the same time period by hand recording data
from the Congressional Yellow book (Michaela Buhler 1994-2010). This process included a
member-by-member recording of caucuses listed in the winter volume of the second session
for each congress.
(2013).
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For more information on this process see Chapter 4 of Ringe and Victor

We also collected legislative data on congressional committee assignments from

(Nelson 1993, n.d.; Stewart and Woon 2009) and calculate the number of common committee
assignments between all dyads. Additionally, we collected data on legislators' gender, race,
and leadership status (Manning and Shogan 2009, 2010; Tong 2010; Library of Congress

b
Clerk (Oce of the Clerk 2010 a).
2010; Oce of the Clerk 2010 ).
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Electoral winning percent data come from the House

This dataset includes 864,879 dyad-Congresses across 295,748 dyads for up to nine Con-

1 Yellow

books are published quarterly from Leadership Directories, Inc. We opted to collect the data
from one book for each two-year congress, selecting the nal book published for each congress under the
logic that the nal book might have the most complete information for a term.
2 Legislators are considered a leader if they served as Speaker, Minority/Majority Leader, Minority/Majority Whip, or the Chair or ranking members on a standing legislative committee.
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Figure 3: Descriptive Statistics for Member of Congress Dyads
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Figure 4: Descriptive Statistics for Member of Congress Dyads
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Of those dyad-Congresses, 50.2% share the same party, 4.2% are from the same

state, 1.9% are both female, and 1.3% are both leaders. As can be seen in Figures 3 and 4,
the covoting rates and NOMINATE distances are bimodal as is expected given the likelihood
of covoting with copartisans. The number of common caucuses ranges from zero to 39 but
is zero more than half the time, as is the number of common committees. Mean betweenness and mean degree appear to follow power law distributions, as do the mean number of
terms served and the number of bills cosponsored. The mean electoral % is roughly normally
distributed and the electoral % distance is generally away from zero with a median of 11%.
To test our hypothesis a panel data model is appropriate given that we want to test
the hypothesis where there is variation both across legislator dyads and across Congresses.
There may be concerns about correlation within dyads, so one might include xed or random
eects by dyad. However in this data set this is not a major concern. Even though we have
data for nine consecutive Congresses the mean number of Congresses per dyad is less than
three, so on average the eects of correlation within dyads is negligible.

3 Rerunning

3

The model is

the analysis within single Congresses removes completely concerns about correlation within
dyads and yields the same substantive results, thus we report results from the analysis across Congresses.
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Covoting rate i,t

= Covoting

rate i,t−1 +

Number of common caucuses i,t +
Number of common committees i,t +
Dummy for same party i,t +
Dummy for same state i,t +
Dummy for both female i,t +
Dummy for both party leaders i,t +
NOMINATE distance i,t +
Mean betweenness score i,t +
Mean degree i,t +
Number of measures cosponsored i,t +
Mean electoral % i,t +
Electoral % distance i,t +
Mean number of terms served i,t
The lagged dependent variable addresses autocorrelation in the dependent variable.
estimate the model in

R

using the

plm

We

package to ensure our measures of uncertainty take

into account the panel structure of the data.

Results
Given the size of the dataset we expect that coecient estimates are measurably dierentiable from zero, and except for the mean number of terms served we are able to distinguish
these coecients from zero. The results for the control variables largely comport with expectations. For instance, larger NOMINATE distance between members of a dyad is associated
with much less covoting and being members of the same party is associated with more
covoting.
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Table 1: Covoting Rate by Members of Congress
Estimate

SE

t-value

p-value

(Intercept)

0.26745

0.00100

267.79458

0.00000

(lagged DV)

0.62273

0.00104

599.16819

0.00000

Number of common caucuses

0.00302

0.00007

44.03197

0.00000

Number of common committees

-0.00046

0.00017

-2.65690

0.00789

Dummy for same party

0.04104

0.00038

108.32349

0.00000

Dummy for same state

-0.00286

0.00037

-7.67071

0.00000

Dummy for both female

-0.00420

0.00058

-7.21858

0.00000

Dummy for both party leaders
NOMINATE distance
Mean betweenness score
Mean degree
Number of measures cosponsored
Mean electoral %
Electoral % distance
Mean number of terms served
Notes: Dropped

103rd

0.00381

0.00060

6.34343

0.00000

-0.12306

0.00051

-239.46165

0.00000

0.00000

0.00000

4.22019

0.00002

-0.00002

0.00000

-73.63501

0.00000

0.00022

0.00000

108.95901

0.00000

0.00044

0.00001

49.41905

0.00000

-0.00008

0.00001

-11.29045

0.00000

0.00002

0.00003

0.88245

0.37753

Congress due to inclusion of lagged dependent variable. Includes all

legislator dyads for Congresses 104-111.

ndyad-Congress = 769613, ndyads = 262497.

The coecient on the number of common caucuses is about .003. One way to look at this
is that one additional common caucus is associated with three additional votes in agreement
across a 1000-vote congress. Another interpretation is that three additional common caucuses
is associated with about a 1% higher covoting rate.

Conclusion
In this paper, we recognize that partisan polarization in congress has left some members of
congress frustrated with its associated gridlock. Congressional caucuses provide an excellent
institutional setting in which legislators can seek refuge from gridlock because they are
voluntary, bipartisan, tend to be focused on substantive topics of interest to legislators, and
provide important opportunities for developing relationships across the aisle and obtaining
access to high quality information. Caucuses are also oer a very low cost of membership.
We therefore hypothesize that as congress becomes more polarized caucus participation will
increase as a means of alleviating the negative consequences of polarization.
We measure polarization as covoting and show that covoting increases as a result of
common caucus participation, all else being equal. The substantive eect of caucus participation is small; each additional common caucus is associated with three additional votes in
agreement in a 1000-vote congress.
There is a complicated causal feedback in this system that we have not fully teased out.
Increased polarization causes caucus participation, because polarization breeds frustration
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and caucuses and potentially alleviate that.

But here we show that caucus participation

causes decreased polarization. We seek to better leverage our time series data to tease out
these eects. Additionally, our data oer opportunities to leverage the multiple connections
between legislators on which we have observable data.

We encourage readers to provide

comments along these lines to help improve this research.
While these results are promising we seek to go further with this project and strengthen
the inferential link between the theoretical claim that legislators use caucuses to seek relationships with those whom they would not otherwise have much opportunity to connect,
and that caucuses have the potential to help alleviate legislative gridlock caused by hyperpartisanship and polarization.

There is a wealth of data that we have not yet explored,

including graph-level properties of these multiplex networks. We suspect we can learn something about the functionality of congress by examining these properties overtime.
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